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Abstract: This paper describes and implements the University’s log management system. In this scope, are also described, the collection, the archiving, the 
accessibility, the maintenance for availability, integrity and confidentiality, as well as the verification of the retention time of the information generated by all 
systems managed by University's IT systems. All the information are included in a ISMS's technical procedure, which applies to many entities, namely systems, 
hosts, critical processes, personal information and everything that, through the access to them, can generate some logs. Our approach is an integrated approach, 
which provides us the ability to manage with a unified strategy, different requirements provided by different laws and authorities. The work describes the 
analysis of the different requirements of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, as well as of the Standards ISO/IEC 27001:2013 and ISO/IEC 27002:2013, and the Italian 
legislation on ICT Minimum Measures for Public Administration (which is directly derived from the “CIS Critical Controls for Effective Cyber Defense” 
version 6 of the 2015). Therefore, it describes how to integrate these requirements in the University’s Information Security Management System, to manage 
them, in a coherent and centralized way. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we describe the solution adopted by the University of 
Camerino about the log management system. The approach followed by the 
University is an integrated approach, who provides it the ability to manage 
in a unified strategy (within the Athenaeum's ISMS) different requirements 
provided by different laws and authorities. Specifically, these requirements 
are contained in the Regulation (EU) 2016/679, as well as in the Standards 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 and ISO/IEC 27002:2013, as well as, in the Italian 
legislation on ICT Minimum Measures for Public Administration (which is 
directly derived from the “CIS Critical Controls for Effective Cyber 
Defense” version 6 of the 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The log management system as a tool to ensure compliance 
with GDPR requirements 
 
The article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 establishes that “the controller 
shall [...] implement appropriate technical and organisational measures” 
(c.f. art. 25(1)) ((European Union), 2016). In addition, these measures “are 
designed to implement data-protection principles” (c.f. art. 25(1)) 
((European Union), 2016), and also “to integrate the necessary safeguards 
into the processing in order to meet the requirements of […] Regulation 
and protect the rights of data subjects” (c.f. art. 25(1)) ((European Union), 
2016). Recital 78 further clarifies these concepts, by specifying that “such 
measures could consist, inter alia, of [...] enabling the data subject to monitor 
the data processing, enabling the controller to create and improve security 
features” ((European Union), 2016). 
The ICO’s (which is the UK control authority) has stated that the 
implementation of solutions compliant with the concept of privacy by design, 
must involve a wide range of technical and organizational measures, among 
which there are “security measures to prevent data misuse, such as access 
controls, audit logs and encryption” ((Information Commissioner’s Office), 
2017). 
The implementation of a log management system is useful to support the 
controller in achieving compliance with the GDPR accountability principle too. 
In fact, the article 33 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 establishes that, “in the case 
of a personal data breach, the controller shall without undue delay […], notify 
the personal data breach to the supervisory authority competent” (c.f. art. 
33(1)) ((European Union), 2016). In details, this notification must be provided, 
“where feasible, not later than 72 hours” (c.f. art. 33(1)) ((European Union), 
2016) after the controller have become aware of data breach, “unless the 
personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of 
natural persons” (c.f. art. 33(1)) ((European Union), 2016). Furthermore, 
according to the article 34 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, “the controller shall 
communicate the personal data breach to the data subject without undue delay” 
(c.f. art. 34(1)) [1], in the case that “the personal data breach is likely to result 
in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons” (c.f. art. 34(1)) 
((European Union), 2016). This is a general requirement that could be avoided 
if “the controller has taken subsequent measures which ensure that the high 
risk to the rights and freedoms of data subjects [...] is no longer likely to 
materialize” (c.f. art. 34(2)) ((European Union), 2016). 
Following this approach, the controller must have a support system that help it, 
both in the timely become aware of the data breach, and in the identification of 
what actually happened. Our log management system based on Graylog do both 
these functions. This statement is fully confirmed by the legal obligation of to 
“document any personal data breaches, comprising the facts relating to the 
personal data breach, its effects and the remedial action taken” (c.f. art. 33(5)) 
((European Union), 2016). Even in this case, our log management system is 
Nomenclature 
 
GDPR General Data protection Regulation 
ISMS Information Security Management System 
CODAU Conference of General Directors of Universities Administrations 
CSC Critical Security Controls  
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CAD Italian Code of the Digital Administration 
EUNIS European University Information Systems 
WP29 Data Protection Working Party established by Article 29 of 
Directive 95/46/EC 
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very helpful to accomplishes with this requirements. 
In paragraph 3 will be presented a detail analysis of the tracking of non-
primary information as they are described (Diomede et al., 2017) by the 
Working Group of the “Conference of General Directors of Universities 
Administrations” (CODAU). 
 
3.  The tracking of non-primary information 
 
In order to deal with the particular challenge of the application of minimum 
ICT measures in the complex academic world, the CODAU has provided 
some guidelines (Diomede et al., 2017) about Universities’ main processing 
activities. In this document are analyzed processing related to system and 
network tracking, as well as to application tracking. 
In fact, is not possible to conceive a processing activity that is applicable to 
events registration, without consider some aspects concerning the 
compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation. Sure enough, in 
these registrations are included personal data, namely “any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person («data subject»)” 
(c.f. art. 4(1)) ((European Union), 2016). 
In CODAU opinions’ (Diomede et al., 2017), the ground of the purposes of 
these processing are related to: 
 the fulfillment of a regulatory obligation; 
 the “systemic constraints (e.g. data that for technical reasons are 
strictly necessary for the provision of a service)” (Diomede et al., 2017); 
 the “recording of events to guarantee the protection of data and/or 
information systems (e.g. to support proactive or reactive activities of 
cyber security or data protection)” (Diomede et al., 2017); 
 the recording of events to support; 
 the “recording the sequence of events generated by users as part of an 
administrative process in order to support reconstruction and 
verification activities” (Diomede et al., 2017); 
 the verification of the real use of a service; 
 the internal reporting for administrative purposes. 
It is important to underline that in WP29 Opinion, the meaning of word 
“employees” is related not only to people who have a contractualized 
position with employer, but instead to “all situations where there is an 
employment relationship, regardless of whether this relationship is based 
on an employment contract” (Falque-Pierrotin, 2017). 
Taking into account the new recent technological developments, today the 
monitoring problems is not only related to email and Internet usage, but it 
involves also “newer, potentially more intrusive and pervasive, ways of 
monitoring” (Falque-Pierrotin, 2017). Among these new methods of 
monitoring, the WP29 (Falque-Pierrotin, 2017) specifies some, which are 
also implemented at the University of Camerino; namely: 
 next-Generation Firewalls, which can provide both a variety of 
monitoring technologies (e.g. deep packet inspection, TLS interception, 
website filtering, content filtering, on-appliance reporting, user identity 
information) and data loss prevention; 
 security applications and measures that involve logging employee 
access to the university’s systems; 
 use in the workplace of office applications provided as a cloud 
service, which potentially could cause a detailed logging activity of the 
operations performed by employees; 
 “monitoring of personal devices (e.g., PCs, mobile phones, tablets), 
that employees supply for their work in accordance with a specific use 
policy, […] which enables the distribution of applications, data and 
configuration settings, and patches for mobile devices” (Falque-
Pierrotin, 2017). 
In this regard, the European High Court of Justice has highlighted the 
possibility that corporate communication tools (e.g. telephone calls and instant 
messenger accounts) could also be used for private purposes, but only if this 
secondary use is limited and proportional (PETZOLD, 1997). Furthermore, the 
same entity has also stated that this communication flow “may be covered by 
the notions of «private life» and «correspondence» within the meaning of 
Article 8 paragraph 1 [of the European Convention]” ((European Court of 
Human Rights), 2016). 
Another interesting point is related to the fact that sometimes “the monitoring 
of employees is possible not so much of the deployment of specific technologies, 
but simply because employees are expected to use online applications made 
available by the employer which process personal data” (Falque-Pierrotin, 
2017). This scenario is significant because the use of cloud-based office 
applications is exactly an example of this. 
Finally, it is important to underlining that “generally, prevention should be 
given much more weight than detection” (Falque-Pierrotin, 2017), so WP29 
advises that, controller should prefer to preliminarily block some resources (e.g. 
websites), instead to perform a continuous monitoring of it. 
For a detail analysis, both of data protection techniques (i.e. anonymization, 
pseudonymisation), and of the data re-identification risks, please refer to the 
article named “k-Anonymity” (V. Ciriani S. De Capitani di Vimercati & 
Samarati, 2007). 
 
4. The log management system as a mean to ensure compliance 
with ISO/IEC 27001:2013 and ISO/IEC 27002:2013 standards 
 
An operational implementation of a log management system, from a 
perspective both organizational and technical, can be also a mean to ensure the 
compliance with some ISO/IEC 27000’s family standards, namely 27001:2013 
((International Organization for Standardization), 2013a) and 27002:2013 [9]. 
In the Annex A of the ISO/IEC 27001:2013 standard ((International 
Organization for Standardization), 2013a) are listed 114 controls, divided into 
14 main security controls categories and 35 principal categories of security. 
Inter alia, in the main security control named A.12 “Operations security”, there 
is the principal category named A.12.4 “Logging and monitoring”, which has 
the control objective of “to record events and generate evidence” 
((International Organization for Standardization), 2013a). This category is 
further divided into 4 controls, namely: event logging (A.12.4.1), protection of 
logs information (A.12.4.2), administrator and operator logs (A.12.4.3) and 
clock synchronization (A.12.4.4). The standard ISO/IEC 27002:2013 
((International Organization for Standardization), 2013b) is essential for a 
correct implementation of the ISO/IEC 27001:2013 one; as a matter of fact 
contain some additional information, such as an implementation guidance and 
other information, useful for an appropriate application of the control itself. 
Comparing (the results of this analysis cannot be reproduced in this paper due 
to copyright policies applied by ISO) the content of the AgID Base Security 
Controls and that of the controls described in the ISO/IEC 27001:2013 
standard, it is possible to detect a substantial overlap of the same. 
In particular, while the controls, defined in the ISO/IEC standards under 
examination, highlight the importance of a policy that treats these topics, the 
ABSCs mainly define, and in a more granular way, the technical solutions 
linked to these policies. 
This is consistent with the setting of ISO 27001:2013, which does not deal with 
what is present within the policy, nor its quality, nor, even more so, the quality 
of the instruments that govern it. 
Rather, the focus of the standard is centered on the presence of the management 
mean (i.e. the ISMS and its documents) and on the fact that, in it, the objectives 
of the indicated controls have been taken into consideration. 
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Finally, it should be noted that the ISO/IEC 27002:2013 standard 
((International Organization for Standardization), 2013b) highlights that in 
event logs could be present sensitive data and personally identifiable 
information, so is necessary take into account the introduction of 
appropriate privacy protection measures. 
Furthermore, in the same rule is asserted that system administrators should 
not have permission to erase or de-activate logs of their own activities. 
These aspects were taken into consideration during the definition of the 
University’s ISMS. 
 
5.  The integration with Information Security Management 
System 
 
In order to guarantee the full integration of logs management system with 
the already existing University’s Information security management system 
(ISMS) (Ciclosi F, Mauri M, & Polzonetti A, 2016), a specific technical 
procedure has been modified. This deals with identifying methods of 
collection, archiving, accessibility and maintenance of integrity and 
confidentiality of the log information generated by university’s systems. 
Moreover, the same technical procedure also deals with both the 
information’s verification and their conservation times. 
This is a very complex document, even considering its integration with 
other documents of the Information security management system. In fact, 
there are references to the synchronization of clocks, to the installation of 
the Sidecar Collector agents in the Operating Systems, to the configuration 
of network devices for connection to the Graylog, as well as to the 
University’s business continuity and disaster recovery plans. 
Moreover, this technical procedure references also two electronic registers, 
which are an integrated part of it. In the first one, there are the logs’ details 
generated by the Universities core systems, which are stored in the 
centralized logs collection system. Instead, in the second one, they are 
detailed, both the general configuration of the logs collection system, and 
that of each individual system that sends him its logs. 
At the end of 2017, the technical procedure of logs management has 
undergone significant changes to implement the indications of the 
University of Camerino working group about the application of the “Italian 
minimum security measures for ICT security” ((AgID), 2016). This is a 
working group set up on 29 September 2017, in order to meet the 
requirements indicated in the Circular of the “Agenzia per l’Italia Digitale” 
no. 2 of 18 April 2017 ((AgID), 2017). These aspects are analyzed in detail 
in my paper, named “The risk analysis as a unified approach to satisfy 
GDPR, NIS Directive and ISO 27001 requirements” (Ciclosi, Gentili, 
Rappi, & Belfiore, 2018b), presented in Paris at EUNIS (European 
University Information Systems) 2018 conference. 
From an operative point of view, in this procedure are been included some 
controls of the AgID Basic Security Control’s (ABSC) eighth family. 
Which are a set of controls of the “Italian Cyber Security Framework” 
(Baldoni & Montanari, 2015), who are also derived from the “CIS Critical 
Controls for Effective Cyber Defense” ((The Center for Internet Security), 
2015) version 6 of the 2015. In detail, the controls are those of the ABSC 
type 8.1.3 and 8.2.1, namely, respectively “Events detected by the 
instruments are sent to a central repository (syslog) where they are 
permanently archived” ((AgID), 2017) and “All tools mentioned in 
ABSC_8.1 are monitored and managed centrally. Users are not allowed to 
alter their configuration” ((AgID), 2017). 
 
6. Logs classification mode 
 
The guidelines issued by the CODAU (Diomede et al., 2017) highlight that the 
nature of the data contained is usually critical. Therefore, is needed that the 
security parameters are set, this for an optimal and necessary management in 
keeping logs generation. In the ISMS’s technical procedure, logs are divided 
into two groups:  
 system logs, who are related to systemic and network tracking, and are 
usually generated by events related to the operating systems or network 
equipment; 
 application logs, who are related to applications tracking, and are usually 
generated by the software. 
Also, for a correct log management, is essential that all the systems’ clocks are 
synchronized. 
The significant logs for the system were identified (regardless of their format). 
This was done behalf the security needs, described in the Information Security 
Management System (ISMS) Policy, and taken into consideration by the Risk 
Assessment. Later, they are reported according to a diagram in which are 
present some information about them, namely: description, type, registered 
events and retention. Table I show an extract of this diagram. 
Logs files are useful as safety indicators, so before their cancellation, the 
relevant values will be saved according to the requested modalities. All logs 
include, where possible and according to the EU and Italian laws, IP address, 
event type, time, date and user name. 
In accordance with the provisions of the CODAU guidelines (Diomede et al., 
2017), the University tracks data generated by network devices and 
infrastructural components that are included within the following treatment 
service scopes: 
 tools for analysis and security management, both on the network and on 
client/server systems; 
 use of printing services; 
 VPN access; 
 telephone traffic management and related accounting; 
 traffic management of the videoconferencing network, streaming services 
and video surveillance; 
 remote access to user locations; 
 access to directory-based resources (e.g. LDAP or AD); 
 access to central authentication systems; 
 management of users for identity and access management; 
 access to virtual machines both on premise and in the cloud; 
 access to services both on premise and in the cloud; 
 external administrative access on our system resources; 
 management of the e-mail system in the cloud. 
Analogously, the University tracks session data and application tracking of user 
activities, which are included within the following treatment service scopes: 
 authentication and single sign-on for all web services federated with the 
University's authentication system; 
 user navigation in web applications developed both by the University and 
by third parties; 
 monitoring for statistical purposes of access to websites (e.g. Google 
Analytics); 
 use of client applications developed both by the University and by third 
parties; 
 use of platforms for sending and consulting data in digital preservation. 
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Table 1 - An example of type of events monitored by the University 
 
Description Type Registered events Ret. 
Windows 
events 
System Authentication to domain machines 
(failed or not) 
Activities performed by accounts 
with administrator privileges 
System errors 
180 days 
Network 
devices log 
System Device authentication (failed or 
otherwise) 
Relevant safety events 
System errors 
180 days 
Monitoring 
console 
Application Events of connected systems 180 days 
 
 
7. Description of the logs collection solution 
 
University of Camerino collects and analyzes logs using a dedicated 
platform called Graylog. This is currently installed on a University’s 
Computer Center server, in Linux mode. Configuration and control panel 
are accessible on a SSL connection by connecting to the system’s IP 
address, through the necessary credentials. 
Operating systems, devices and applications are configured to collect the 
desired logs information, and store them according to the defined security 
parameters. Two systems are identified for the collection of logs. The first 
one concerning the logs generated directly by the applications in use, while 
the second one, is pertinent the storing of authentication logs of system 
administrators. The latter collection system has also been implemented, to 
meet the requirements, imposed by the Italian supervisory authority on the 
protection of personal data.  
It is not possible to directly connect to the logs manager system, by SSH 
and as privileged user. Instead, all the authorized administrators must to use 
their personal account to connect by SSH. 
In any case, this particular type of connection can only be made temporarily 
and only to perform specific system maintenance activities, which cannot 
be done differently. 
Rather, the normal activities related to the use of the system will have to 
hinder via the web, through HTTPS connection, as described previously. 
The Graylog system is been configured for to get the best filter information 
in order to guarantee a more immediate selection of events that need 
verification, as well as in order to organize the notification of such events. 
Moreover, these configurations allow me to create a reporting system to get 
a general overview of the situation and of its evolution over time. This was 
also achieved by creating particular custom dashboards, an example of 
which is shown in the Figure 1. 
To this end, University’s technicians are working to define rules, also 
created as needed to have active response to an event considered sensitive. 
The configuration of the Graylog system, in use by the Center, provides 
some basic settings that can be individually modified by the system 
manager. 
As regards the transmission of information between the log-producing 
devices and the central management console, different methods are used. 
Graylog nodes accept data via inputs. Therefore, in the central system I have 
configured three different input node, namely one for network devices, one 
for syslog sent by means of UDP protocol and, finally, one beats-input for 
Windows and Linux based systems. 
Instead, the configuration at the level of the individual nodes is different. 
On the one hand, the Center’s technicians have redirected the syslog of network 
devices, and of any devices that uses this technology to the central system. 
While, on the other side, system’s administrators have installed as a service, in 
each Windows and Linux node, a special agent (called “Graylog Collector 
Sidecar”). This agent is configured to send the system logs, via HTTPS, to a 
specific API exposed by the central collection system. 
The global function of University’s logs collector system is described in a 
ISMS’s technical procedure, which has been prepared in compliance with the 
following, both laws (EU and Italians), and international standards: 
 Directive of the President of the Council of Ministers August 1, 2015 
(Renzi, 2015); 
 Legislative Decree of 7 March 2005, n. 82 (also known as CAD - 
Administration Code Digital) (GU n.112 del 16-5-2005-Suppl. Ordinario n. 
93, 2016); 
 Circolare AgID 18 April 2017, n. 2/2017, containing “Replacement of 
circular no. 1/2017 of 17 March 2017, containing: «Minimum ICT security 
measures for public administrations. (Directive of the President of the 
Council of Ministers August 1, 2015)»” ((AgID), 2017); 
 CIS Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense - version 6.0 of 
October 2015 ((The Center for Internet Security), 2015); 
 La Sapienza - 2015 Italian Cyber Security Report of the CIS (Baldoni & 
Montanari, 2015); 
 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 ((International Organization for Standardization), 
2013a); 
 ISO/IEC 27002:2013 ((International Organization for Standardization), 
2013b); 
 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 ((European Union), 2016); 
 Legislative Decree no. 196 of 30 June 2003, Italian “Personal Data 
Protection Code” (English translate by Italian Authority for the protection 
of personal data) ((Italian Parliament), 2003). 
 
 
Figure 1 - Example of a Graylog dashboard panel 
 
8. Log storage for disaster revovery purposes 
 
The logs collected by the Graylog system are stored in redounded systems, and 
are synchronized in a remote storage, as better described in the University’s 
business continuity and disaster recovery plans. 
The complete list of logs backed up is kept in a special electronic register 
(named “Backup Log Sheet”) that is updated every time the configuration of the 
backup settings changes. This sheet is divided in three sections, namely: log, 
recording modality and responsibility. 
In the log section, the following information are recorded: 
 Hostname, who contains the name (or the IP address) of the system from 
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which the logs are taken; 
 Log type, who contains the type of the taken logs (e.g. syslog, directory 
file, name of windows logs). 
Furthermore, in the recording modality section, the following information 
are recorded: 
 notification, which contains the list of e-mail addresses to which 
notification messages are sent regarding logs capture and backup 
events; 
 log consolidation, which contains information, both on what is 
consolidated, and about its frequency and scheduling time; 
 retention policy, which contains information about the typical retention 
time of these information; 
 backup path, which contains the full path of backup archives; 
 credentials, which contain (if available) the user credentials used to 
capture the logs files from remote systems. 
Finally, in the responsibility section, is recorded only the following 
information: 
 Function involved, which contains the internal sector that is 
responsible for monitoring the operation of log acquisition and saving, 
as well as the updating of the “Backup Log Sheet”. 
 
9. Logs analysis 
 
The analysis of the collected logs is performed using the dedicated Graylog 
software tool (described in paragraph 7 and showed in Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 - Example of the Graylog software analysis panel 
 
This activity aims to identify and resolve malfunctions, problems, attacks and 
any other events that could threaten the normal operation of the University’s 
information system. Moreover, this activity also provides useful data for 
system’s improvement, such as, for example, indicators used in the ISMS. 
Now the University is preparing for to define an optimal information filtering 
method. This is necessary in order to guarantee an immediate selection of 
events that need verification. Likewise, University is defining, both the 
procedures for notifying such events, and the implementation of a reporting 
system, aimed at showing a general outline of the situation, as well as its 
evolution over time. 
In log analysis activity the authorized personnel takes also into account, the 
network attached devices inventory included in university's ISMS. This 
inventory is described in detail in my paper, named “The network attached 
devices inventory as required both by the Italian requirement of «Minimal 
measures for ICT security» and by General Data Protection Regulation” 
(Ciclosi, Gentili, Rappi, & Belfiore, 2018a), presented in Paris at EUNIS 
(European University Information Systems) 2018 conference. 
 
10. Conclusions 
 
The use of an integrated approach to the management of information protection, 
on the subject of centralized management of logs produced by university’s 
devices, represents a piece of a broader methodology adopted by the University 
of Camerino. This is a general and holistic vision, aimed at guaranteeing data 
protection and compliance with every requirement, established by laws and by 
international standards, through their management, within the University’s 
ISMS. This choice has allowed the University of Camerino, among other 
things, both to increase the continuous improvement of its system, and to satisfy 
the accountability principle enunciated by Regulation (EU) 2016/679. 
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